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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Robert Conrad Macneilage was convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of 
insurance fraud.  On appeal, Mr. Macneilage contends that the district court erred when 
it denied his motion to allow him to impeach the credibility of two State’s witnesses 
using their past felony convictions for burglary and theft of a credit card.  After he was 
sentenced to unified terms of six years, with two years fixed, the district court retained 
jurisdiction, but then relinquished jurisdiction after the rider.  On appeal, Mr. Macneilage 
contends that his sentence represents an abuse of the district court’s discretion, as it is 
excessive given any view of the facts.  Mr. Macneilage further asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion when it relinquished its jurisdiction.   
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Macneilage operated his own auto repair and auto repossession company.  
He would occasionally purchase used or salvaged vehicles and repair them for resale.  
(Trial Tr., p.119, L.13 – p.120, L.3.)  In March of 2013, Mr. Macneilage purchased a 
2013 BMW to repair and resell.  (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.4-24.) 
On March 27, 2013, Mr. Macneilage reported that the 2013 BMW had been in an 
accident.  (Trial Tr., p.103, L.13 – p.104, L.7, p.105, L.17 – p.106, L.9, p.289, Ls.9-17.)  
He reported that, while towing the BMW behind his truck, the hydraulic line had failed, 
causing the lift to lose pressure and fail, which ultimately caused the car to come loose 
and hit the back of the truck.  (Trial Tr., p.300, Ls.15-20.)  The car rammed into the back 
of Mr. Macneilage’s truck, damaging the truck as well as the car.  (Trial Tr., p.300, Ls.2-
20.)  Mr. Macneilage had insurance on the vehicles, so an adjustor was contacted who 
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declared the car a total loss and the claim was paid.  (Trial Tr., p.282, Ls.12-17, p.290, 
Ls.10-12.)  (Trial Tr., p.295, L.24 – p.296, L.6.)  He received a check from the insurance 
company for $11,600 for the car and the next week he received a check for $640, the 
damage to the truck.  (Trial Tr., p.295, L.24 – p.296, L.6, p.302, Ls.3-8, p.307, Ls.7-12.)   
After Ronald Gibson, Mr. Macneilage’s former business partner, had a falling out 
with Mr. Macneilage, he reported to the insurance company that Mr. Macneilage had 
intentionally damaged the two vehicles.  (Trial Tr., p.157, L.21 – p.159, L.24, p.306, 
Ls.21-24.)  An insurance investigator began an inquiry into the facts surrounding the 
accident.  (Trial Tr., p.306, Ls.4-11.)  The insurance investigator interviewed Tanner 
Myers, a disgruntled former employee of Mr. Macneilage’s, who claimed that he was 
with Mr. Macneilage when he intentionally damaged the car and truck.  (Trial Tr., p.173, 
Ls.22-23, p.177, L.8 – p.183, L.16, p.186, Ls.11-20, p.187, L.12 – p.188, L.3, p.306, 
Ls.15-20, p.313, Ls.10-21.)  Based on these facts, Mr. Macneilage was charged by 
Information with four counts of insurance fraud—two counts for statements he made 
regarding damage to the car and two counts for statements made regarding damage to 
the truck.  (R., pp.32, 56-57.)1   
At the jury trial, the State presented the testimony of several witnesses including 
the testimony of Tanner Myers, Ronald Gibson, Richard Gibson, and Justin Hansen, 
who were present when Mr. Macneilage was talking about intentionally damaging the 
car.  (Trial Tr., p.121, L.25 – p.124, L.9, p.200, Ls.9-23, p.262, Ls.5-23, p.265, Ls.8-20, 
p.270, L.24 – p.272, L.1.)  These witnesses testified that Mr. Macneilage had joked 
                                            
1 Mr. Macneilage has used the page numbers of the electronic record because the 
Clerk’s Record was not numbered in conformance with the requirements of I.A.R. 16(e). 
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about intentionally damaging the car after he leaned that it would be several months 
before the part necessary to fix the car arrived.  (Trial Tr., p.122, L.22 – p.123, L.16, 
p.141, L.12 – p.145, L.21, p.167, Ls.10-19; p.200, Ls.9-23, p.242, L.25 – p.248, L.11, 
p.265, Ls.8-25.)  They testified that they had offered suggestions to Mr. Macneilage as 
to how the car could be damaged so that Mr. Macneilage could collect the insurance 
proceeds.  (Trial Tr., p.123, Ls.4-16, p.200, Ls.9-23, p.270, L.24 – p.272, L.1.)  All of 
these witnesses were friends with or relatives of Ronald Gibson, the individual who had 
had a falling-out with Mr. Macneilage just prior to reporting the intentional act to the 
insurance company.  (Trial Tr., p.122, Ls.6-10, p.131, L.8 – p.132, L.1, p.153, L.12 – 
p.159, L.24, p.259, Ls.14-16, p.267, Ls.23-24.)   
Apparently, more than a month after the accident with the BMW, Mr. Macneilage 
and Mr. Gibson got into a fistfight.  (Trial Tr., p.157, L.13 – p.158, L.1.)  Mr. Gibson 
claims he was punched by Mr. Macneilage while he was holding his daughter, then 
Mr. Gibson put Mr. Macneilage in a headlock while Mr. Macneilage was still holding the 
child.  (Trial Tr., p.155, L.19 – p.156, L.10.)  Mr. Gibson was then charged with 
disturbing the peace and battery on a three year old.  (Trial Tr., p.155, Ls.2-9.)  
Afterward, Mr. Gibson sent text messages to Mr. Macneilage, harassing him and 
threatening to report the insurance fraud unless Mr. Macneilage dropped the charges.  
(Trial Tr., p.153, L.21 – p.162, L.7.) 
Mr. Gibson testified that after he heard about the accident, Mr. Macneilage told 
him the BMW slipped off the lift accidentally.  (Trial Tr., p.147, Ls.19-22, p.148, L.22 – 
p.149, L.15.)  Mr. Gibson also claimed that Mr. Macneilage then told him a different 
version—that he pulled the BMW to the outskirts of town, took the straps off the back 
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tires, and then sped up only to hit the brakes, causing the BMW to roll off the lift and hit 
the truck.  (Trial Tr., p.129, L.2 – p.130, L.4.)  Mr. Macneilage then rammed the front of 
the BMW with the truck.  (Trial Tr., p.130, Ls.5-11.) 
Prior to the testimony of two of the State’s witnesses, Richard Gibson and Justin 
Hansen, defense counsel advised that it may wish to inquire of the witnesses as to the 
subject of their prior felony convictions.  (Trial Tr., p.253, L.22 – p.257, L.23.)  The 
district court denied defense counsel’s request, finding that the crime of burglary was 
not one involving moral turpitude.  (Trial Tr., p.254, L.21 – p.255, L.6.)   
 The jury convicted Mr. Macneilage of two counts of insurance fraud.  (Trial 
Tr., p.452, Ls.1-12; R., p.55.)  Mr. Macneilage was acquitted of two counts pertaining to 
his statements to Investigator Brinkley after the jury could not reach a decision.  (Trial 
Tr., p.452, Ls.15-24; R., pp.58-59.)  At sentencing, defense counsel asked the district 
court to consider placing Mr. Macneilage on probation, which had been the State’s initial 
offer during plea negotiations.  (Trial Tr., p.467, Ls.2-8, p.469, Ls.21-23.)  The State 
recommended a sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, for each count, 
concurrent, but that the district court retain jurisdiction.  (Trial Tr., p.470, Ls.7-11.)  The 
district court sentenced Mr. Macneilage to six years, with two years fixed, on each 
count, concurrent, but retained jurisdiction.  (Trial Tr., p.487, L.17 – p.488, L.11; 
R., pp.68-69.)   
Mr. Macneilage and the State stipulated to an amount of restitution.  (R., p.76.)  
Two months later, the district court relinquished jurisdiction without a hearing.  
(R., p.83.)  Mr. Macneilage filed a motion for a new trial based on the discovery of two 
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witness who recalled seeing the truck and car in the area Mr. Macneilage had testified 
the accident occurred.  (R., pp.84-85.) 
However, the district court denied Mr. Macneilage’s motion after a hearing, 
finding he had failed to meet the first, third, and fourth elements of the test set forth in 
State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685 (1976).  (Augmentation, p.9.) 




1. Did the district court err when it prohibited Mr. Macneilage from questioning the 
State’s witnesses on the substance of their past felony convictions pursuant to 
I.R.E. 609? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by sentencing Mr. Macneilage 
excessively? 
 







The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Macneilage’s Motion To Admit The Nature Of 
The Prior Convictions 
 
A. Introduction 
 The district court erred in denying Mr. Macneilage’s motion to be permitted to 
attack the credibility of two witnesses using information as to their past criminal 
convictions.  Richard Gibson had been convicted of credit card theft, and Justin Hansen 
had been convicted of burglary.  Where all of the parties to the conversation in which 
jokes were made about how to intentionally damage the BMW were persons who either 
were angry with Mr. Macneilage, and thus had a motive to lie, or had a history of 
dishonesty as shown through felony criminal convictions, the district court erred by 
denying Mr. Macneilage’s ability to examine the two witnesses about the substance of 
their past felony convictions. 
  
B. Relevant Law 
 Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) General rule.  For the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence of the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and 
the nature of the felony shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or 
established by public record, but only if the court determines in a hearing 
outside the presence of the jury that the fact of the prior conviction or the 
nature of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant to the credibility of the 
witness and that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs 
its prejudicial effect to the party offering the witness. 
 
I.R.E. 609(a).  Under this rule, the trial court must apply a two pronged test to determine 
whether evidence of the prior conviction should be admitted:  (1) whether the fact or 
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nature of the conviction is relevant to the witnesses’ credibility; and (2) if so, the court 
must then determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial impact.  State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 630 (1999).  The district court’s 
decision as to the first part concerning relevance is reviewed de novo.  Id.  As for the 
second part, whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
impact, such is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Id. 
“[D]ifferent felonies have different degrees of probative value of the issue of 
credibility.”  State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 580 (1981) (quoting People v. Rollo, 569 
P.2d 771, 775 (1977)).  The Ybarra Court adopted the three categories of felonies that 
the Rollo Court used to determine whether a prior conviction could be used for 
impeachment.  Id. at 580-81.  Crimes such as perjury which are “intimately connected” 
to the issue of credibility are in category one, while crimes that are “somewhat less 
relevant” to the issue of credibility fall in category two.  Id.  Category three consisted of 
“’[a]cts of violence . . . [which] generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and 
veracity.’”  Id. at 501 (quoting Rollo, 569 P.2d at 775).  Regarding category two crimes, 
the Ybarra Court noted: 
On the other hand robbery, larceny, and burglary, while not showing a 
propensity to falsify, do disclose a disregard for the rights of others which 
might reasonably be expected to express itself in giving false testimony 
whenever it would be to the advantage of the witness. If the witness had 
no compunction against stealing another’s property or taking it away from 
him by physical threat or force, it is hard to see why he would hesitate to 
obtain an advantage for himself or friend in a trial by giving false 
testimony. Furthermore, such criminal acts, although evidenced by a 
single conviction, may represent such a marked break from sanctioned 
conduct that it affords a reasonable basis of future prediction upon 
credibility. . . . 
 
Id. (quoting Ladd, Credibility Test—Current Trends, 89 u. Pa. L. Rev. 166, 180 (1940)). 
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 In weighing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect, the 
trial court should consider: 
[T]he impeachment value of the prior crime, the remoteness of the prior 
conviction, the witness’ criminal history, the similarity between the past 
crime and the crime charged, the importance of the witness's testimony, 
the centrality of the credibility issue, and the nature and extent of the 
witness’ criminal record as a whole.  
 
State v. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1066, 1073 (Ct. App. 1990), aff'd, 119 Idaho 1047 (1991). 
 
C. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Macneilage’s Motion To Admit The 
Nature Of The Prior Convictions 
 
Pursuant to I.R.E. 609, defense counsel sought to use the nature of two of the 
State’s witnesses’ felony criminal convictions in its examination of the witnesses.  (Trial 
Tr., p.253, L.23 – p.258, L.13.)  However, the district court denied the motions as to 
both witnesses and only permitted defense counsel to examine the witnesses as to the 
fact that they had both been convicted of a felony.  (Trial Tr., p.254, Ls.21-24, p.258, 
Ls.12-13.)  Defense counsel was not permitted to inquire as to the nature of the felony 
convictions.  (Trial Tr., p.258, Ls.12-13.)  The district court erred as it failed to 
determine, as required under I.R.E. 609(a):  (1) whether the fact of the prior conviction 
or the nature of the prior conviction were relevant to the credibility of the witness; and 
(2) whether the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighed its prejudicial 
effect. 
 1. Justin Hansen’s Burglary Conviction  
 Defense counsel advised the district court that it wished to examine witness 
Justin Hansen regarding his burglary conviction for which he was currently on probation.  
(Trial Tr., p.253, Ls.23-25.)  The district court ruled that it would allow reference to the 
 10 
fact that Mr. Hansen was convicted of a felony but would not allow reference to the 
nature of the felony, finding that burglary was not a crime of moral turpitude.  (Trial 
Tr., p.254, L.21 – p.255, L.6.)  In so ruling, the district court noted that the purpose of 
the rule was to keep the jury from hearing about unduly prejudicial information.  (Trial 
Tr., p.256, Ls.2-4.)  The district court stated: 
That is – as I understand the rule, there’s a two-part finding that I must 
make.  Number one, has he been convicted of a felony?  Number two, is 
the nature of the felony such that it is warranted to inform the jury of that – 
of the nature of the felony because it reflects upon credibility?  And that’s 
– burglary is such a common crime, and there are so many ways to 
commit it, that I’m simply not going to allow that reference here. 
 
(Trial Tr., p.256, Ls.17-25.)  Thus, the district court erred as it did not apply the two-
pronged test set forth in Thompson:  (1) whether the fact or nature of the conviction is 
relevant to the witness’ credibility; and (2) if so, the court must then determine whether 
the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact.  Thompson, 132 
Idaho at 630.   
 In this situation, a burglary conviction “while not showing a propensity to falsify, 
do[es] disclose a disregard for the rights of others which might reasonably be expected 
to express itself in giving false testimony whenever it would be to the advantage of the 
witness.”  Ybarra, 102 Idaho at 501.  Thus, a witness such as Mr. Hansen who “had no 
compunction against stealing another’s property” would probably not “hesitate to obtain 
an advantage for himself or friend in a trial by giving false testimony.” Id.  Even a single 
conviction for this type of crime “may represent such a marked break from sanctioned 
conduct that it affords a reasonable basis of future prediction upon credibility” and would 
be probative of the witness’ truthfulness, more probative than any prejudicial impact.  
See id. 
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2. Richard Gibson’s Conviction For Possession Of A Stolen Credit Card  
 
Once defense counsel realized the next witness the State intended to call was 
Richard Gibson, counsel moved the district court to allow him to ask the witness about 
his past criminal conviction for theft of a credit card or possession of a stolen credit 
card.  (Trial Tr., p.257, L.15 – p.258, L.11.)  The district court allowed reference to the 
conviction, but not to the nature of the crime and did not provide any further explanation.  
(Trial Tr., p.258, Ls.12-13.) 
 The district court failed to analyze whether the possession of a stolen credit card 
conviction was relevant to the witness’ credibility; and if so, whether the probative value 
of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial impact.  See Thompson, 132 Idaho at 630.  
Here, a theft charge was undoubtedly related to a witness’s veracity and would be 
probative of truthfulness, more probative than any prejudicial impact. 
 The district court erroneously denied Mr. Macneilage the opportunity to impeach 
the veracity of two of the State’s witnesses using their felony criminal convictions. 
   
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence 
 
Mr. Macneilage asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate unified 
sentence of six years, with two years fixed, is excessive.  Where a defendant contends 
that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court 
will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of 
the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.  See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).   
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.’”  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).  Mr. Macneilage does not allege 
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.  Accordingly, in order to show an 
abuse of discretion, Mr. Macneilage must show that in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts.  Id.  The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are:  (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.  Id.  
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Macneilage’s sentence is 
excessive considering any view of the facts. 
An important fact that should have received the attention of the district court is 
that Mr. Macneilage has strong support from family and members of the community.  
See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant 
who had the support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts).  This is 
clear by the six letters he received in support.  (Letters from Audrey Barnes, Shane 
Chastain, Chris Albert, Tiffani Cromwell, Edward Weiss, and Pauline Weiss.)  The 
letters describe a kind, generous, hardworking man who is a good father to his three 
year old daughter.  Mr. Macneilage has custody of his little girl, and spends his free time 
playing with her.  (Letters from Pauline Weiss, Tiffani Cromwell, and Robert Macneilage; 
PSI, p.8.) 
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Another mitigating fact is that Mr. Macneilage has a good work history.  
Mr. Macneilage has owned his own business, Idaho Asset Recovery, for the last three 
years, and is skilled in sales, managing, marketing, and working in the oil fields.  (PSI, 
p.11.)  Idaho recognizes that good employment history should be considered a 
mitigating factor.  See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); see also Shideler, 103 
Idaho at 595.   
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Macneilage asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him.  He asserts 
that, had the district court properly considered his good work history and family and 
community support, it would have imposed a less severe sentence. 
 
III. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over 
Mr. Macneilage 
 
Before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction over a defendant, it must 
evaluate whether probation would be appropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. 
Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001).  “The decision to place a defendant on probation or 
whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an 
abuse of that discretion.”   State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-289 (Ct. App. 
2010).  Upon review of a sentence following a period of retained jurisdiction, this Court 
reviews the entire record, encompassing events both before and after the original 
judgment.  Id. at 289. 
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Mr. Macneilage contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing 
jurisdiction in light of his limited successes during his period of retained jurisdiction and 
his desire to make the changes in his life. 
Mr. Macneilage was participating in his programming and had expressed a 
willingness to make changes in his life.  (APSI, pp.8, 16.)  Although, while on his rider, 
Mr. Macneilage did receive disciplinary sanctions,2 he also engaged in commendable 
behavior, including volunteering to wash cars.  (APSI, p.17.)  In his volunteer job, 
Mr. Macneilage worked hard and did a great job.  (APSI, p.17.)  Mr. Macneilage did 
completed the FATHERS program.  (APSI, p.2.)  In the class he developed an 
awareness of the importance of positive role modeling and completed all assignments.  
(APSI, p.6.)  However, Mr. Macneilage’s progress on the rider was severely impeded by 
the fact that he was attacked by another inmate who struck Mr. Macneilage in the head 
with a 6.5 pound piece of bread dough.  (APSI, pp.4-6.)  Mr. Macneilage was singled 
out and intimidated by other inmates.  (APSI, p.4.)   
The district court failed to recognize that Mr. Macneilage’s accomplishments 
while on the retained jurisdiction would equate to a successful probation when it 
relinquished its jurisdiction over Mr. Macneilage.  (R., p.83.)  In light of all of the 
mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court that demonstrates 
Mr. Macneilage’s significant rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its 
discretion when it relinquished its jurisdiction over Mr. Macneilage. 
                                            
2 Mr. Macneilage received an envelope with a letter and seven photos of a partially 
nude female; this behavior resulted in a Disciplinary Offense Report (DOR).  (APSI, 
p.3.)   
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Macneilage respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and 
remand for a new trial.  Alternatively, Mr. Macneilage requests that this Court place him 
on probation or reduce his sentence as it sees fit.   
 DATED this 6th day of May, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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